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Although the discussion of the ethics in our case is in
regard to the first situation, we shall begin with a discus-
sion of the ethics of the latter, because it is there where
most of the normative ethical reflection on placebo use
is found.
The Declaration of Helsinki (DoH), first adopted in
1964, indisputably serves today as the ethical guideline
for physicians and those who practice medical research.
It elevates concerns for the health and rights of indi-
vidual patients currently being treated over those of
future new potential patients, as well as those of society
and science. Therefore, it is not surprising that the DoH
states that “every patient, including those of a control
group, should be assured of the best current diagnostic
and therapeutic method”, thereby proscribing the use of
placebo control when a proven therapeutic method
exists [2]. This concept is referred to by certain authors
as “clinical equilibrium” (equipoise), where every
patient is guaranteed a medical treatment [3]. Thus,
testing a new drug with placebo or no treatment when a
known effective therapy exists would be, in fact, con-
trary to patients’ interests. Unfortunately, in reality,
many placebo-control and not active-treatment con-
trolled trials are conducted, despite the availability of
adequate treatment [4–8], perhaps due to the fact that
placebo control has the stature of a “hallmark of good
science”, together with blinding and randomization,
without sound justification.
The most recent (fifth) revision of the DoH, adopted
in 2000 by the World Medical Association (WMA),
seemed to reiterate the longstanding prohibition on
using placebo instead of effective therapy when a
beneficial treatment for a condition has already been
recognized [9], until a clarification note to article 29
appeared in 2001 [10]. Unfortunately, this addendum
permitted a less restrictive interpretation of the article,
introducing ambiguity by leaving room for the use of
placebo when “scientific methodological reasons” or
“minor conditions” dictate so. This clarification in fact
Key words Placebo · Ethics · Randomized Controlled Trial ·
Declaration of Helsinki
The case
During the 2005 meeting of the Special Interest
Group in Ethics of the American Pain Society, the use
of placebo1 in the management of pain medicine was
debated. The practice of intrathecal saline (placebo)
injections for determining the need to implant intrathe-
cal drug delivery systems (IDDS) was presented and
discussed, followed by the question: Is this practice
ethical? The goal of this article is to respond to this
question and to focus on the ethical framework for the
use of placebo drugs and surgery in research and in
clinical care, while pointing out the fundamental differ-
ence between placebo use in  the research and clinical
care settings.
The use of placebo drugs in clinical trials
The use of placebo in the clinical setting may be seen in
two distinct situations. First, eliciting a placebo effect to
determine the clinical efficacy of a treatment, and
second, as a control in an experimental situation [1].
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1 The term “placebo” is difficult to define satisfactorily, be-
cause many interventions (invasive or not) are referred to as
placebos, but are not (pills, capsules, bandages, images, pic-
tures). We prefer the idea of a “specific” versus a “non-
specific” intervention and thus we shall refer to placebo as
“. . . a control treatment with similar appearance to a study
treatment, but without its specific activity . . .” (see PC
Gotzsche, in Lancet 1994; 344:925–926). Discussion on nocebo
(adverse effects of placebo) is beyond the scope of this text
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does not clarify at all and does not give details regarding
the “methodological reasons” for which the use of
placebo is justified, nor does it give details of what are
the “minor conditions” in which the use of placebo will
cause the subject only “minor” harm.
Both ethical and scientific arguments have been
raised in the defense of not using placebo in place of an
existing treatment. As for the ethical arguments: first
the DoH states clearly that patients must receive best
current treatment, even if it is a not-proven treatment.
Thus, comparison between standard and novel thera-
pies is ethically preferred to comparison between
placebo and no treatment. This, of course, presupposes
that a “standard” treatment exists. Because “standard”
suggests “normative”, this poses some difficulties when
only non-standard treatments are available. For this
reason, “best proven therapy” has been the preferred
definition, conveying the idea that often no single
“standard” treatment really exists.
Second, there seems to be no moral justification for
patients having to endure even “minor” discomfort
associated with placebo treatment, when in fact this
discomfort is prohibited in active treatment. Third,
the utilitarian argument (a few suffer for the good of
many) is ethically questionable (as opposed to the case
of vaccinations, for example), because the immediate
needs of the patient always take precedence over the
interests of science and society [11]. This “moral” hier-
archy provides the practitioner with a coherent ap-
proach when patient welfare and the utility of scientific
knowledge conflict. Finally, true patient autonomy can
be accepted only when patients consent not only to the
trial but also to the trial design (i.e., a patient willing to
participate in a trial may actually prefer to enroll for a
best proven available treatment rather than for a pla-
cebo control study).
Further, not only ethical but also scientific arguments
challenge the need to incorporate placebo in our prac-
tice. First, there is increasing evidence that the magni-
tude of the placebo response varies according to prior
conditioning, expectancy, and subject attention [12].
The activation of specific brain areas during placebo
can, in fact, mimic similar changes seen with active
treatments [13,14]. Thus, if placebo and active re-
sponses (e.g., pain relief) share similar neuronal
networks, the idea that placebo is an “inert” non-
intervention is incorrect. Second, not only are placebo
responses as potentially variable as active treatments,
the latter in fact may provide a more regular and consis-
tent physiological response. Third, most physicians
prefer to know that treatment with X is better than
treatment with Y, rather than knowing that X is better
than no treatment at all. Last, methodological develop-
ments in statistics raise questions about the need for the
use of placebo as a research tool [15].
The use of placebo in clinical care
The idea of using placebo in clinical care appears to
respect the principles of beneficence and non-
smaleficence. Doctors should not expose patients to
risks if there is no prospect of possible benefit from a
treatment, and doctors should always bear the moral
responsibility to act in their patients’ best interests. This
statement, however, confounds the ethics of clinical re-
search and the ethics of clinical care. As we have already
mentioned, the DoH specifies that patients’ interests
need not be “sacrificed” when they are participating in
a clinical trial. However, clinical trials are not designed
to promote the patient’s best interest; they are designed
to answer valuable scientific questions. Thus, although
the ethical argument behind the use of placebo-control
in clinical trials is that only with the use of a valid
research method (i.e., placebo-control) is the patient’s
well-being protected, in clinical care it is the other way
around. First the patient, then the science [16].
But others will continue to argue that, for over 20
years, hundreds of patients were encouraged to undergo
ligation of the internal mammary artery, a risky open
chest surgery with unproven efficacy for the treatment
of angina pectoris, until two placebo-controlled
studies demonstrated it to be no more efficacious than
sham surgery [17,18]. Similarly, Moseley et al. [19]
showed that arthroscopic surgery of the knee for
osteoarthritis yielded effects similar to those of a
placebo operation. Because the use of a placebo control
is regarded as the gold standard in clinical trials [20],
it seems logical and ethical to incorporate placebo
use into our research. But is it ethical, for example, to
perform sham surgery?
One of the consequences of the limitations of current
medical treatments is the proliferation of devices and
the explosion of minimally invasive surgery techniques.
For investigators and clinicians living through this
recent growth spurt of novel treatments, it is clear that
an implanted device or surgery is not a drug [21]. The
clinical effect of a drug (as long as the dose is correct) is
not dependent on the talent of the presciber, whereas
clinical success in surgery is highly dependent on the
operator’s skill. Randomization between “medical” and
“surgical” treatments may be emotionally difficult for
both patient and investigator, thus inducing method-
ological flaws and the need for large sample sizes to
prove benefit.
The recent use of sham surgery in randomized con-
trolled trials raises three major ethical questions. First,
how do we negotiate the conflict between the need for a
placebo-designed trial and the exposure of the patient
to the risks of sham surgery (principle of non-
maleficence)? Second, how do we assess the real risks
and benefits of sham surgery? Third, does the require-
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ment of informed consent imply that potential subjects
are free to assume any risk, even if they are informed
[22]? Although defenders of sham surgery may support
its need from a methodological point of view or by
claiming a standard similar to that for drug trials (pla-
cebo drug trials are ethically permissible when no alter-
native treatment exists), performing sham surgery in
fact poses a real risk of harm to patients. Sham surgery
is not an inert substance,2 and performing a procedure
that has no expected benefit violates the principle of
minimizing the risk of harm, which violates the principle
of non-maleficence (do no harm).
Assessing this risk, however, is not straightforward.
Risks are not only limited to the morbidity of the inter-
vention, even if this is rare, but, also, what is considered
“not risky” by the professional may be considered
“extremely risky” by the lay person (e.g., “drilling holes
in the head is as risky as drilling a hole in a tooth”) [23].
Finally, disclosure of the research design does not elimi-
nate the known placebo effect of surgery, nor does it
justify the exposure of patients to risks that would not
be imposed by an alternative research design. Although
the current vogue is to respect patient autonomy (hence
creating a reluctance for any paternalistic protective
approach by physicians), consent forms frequently
overstate the benefits and understate the risks of
research protocols. But even when consent forms are
accurate, the expectations of patients may remain unre-
alistic, rendering autonomy a relative state of mind.
The final and perhaps most important ethical concern
when using placebo in clinical care is the deception
associated with its use. The fact that the use of placebo
in clinical care necessitates complete ignorance on the
part of the patient (as opposed to patient information in
clinical research) renders this approach morally intoler-
able. This use of placebo contravenes the “pact of con-
fidentiality” in the doctor–patient relationship, which is
the nucleus of the therapeutic dialogue [24]. Further-
more, the belief that use of a placebo may distinguish
between organic (“real”) and functional (“unreal”) con-
ditions, revealing malingerers or placating insistent
patients (“placebo” in Latin: I shall please) is simply
incorrect, because in any case the placebo provides a
response even if it is a “non-response”. The deceptive
use of placebo not only violates the fundamentals of the
physician–patient relationship but harbors in it the po-
tential for an intentional act of fraud [25]. Even in-
formed consent cannot completely exonerate physicians
from responsibility, and they should not attempt to pass
the ethical responsibility over to the patient. Patients
are rarely if ever as well informed about their treatment
options as their physicians, and patients are seldom dis-
interested enough to reach a rational decision regarding
their treatment options. Finally, “successful” placebos
may be even more dangerous than “failed” ones,
because they perpetuate the deceit by leading to lying,
or the avoiding of truthful answers to legitimate ques-
tions patients might have regarding side effects, drug
interactions, and other aspects of informed consent [26].
Conclusions
In summary, the use of placebo in research is not funda-
mentally unethical under certain conditions (informed
consent; “clinical equilibrium”). On the contrary, the
use of placebo in clinical care, even when patients are
informed (if this is possible) endangers the foundation
of care and trust between patients and physicians and is
thus morally unacceptable [27]. So, back to our case—
the use of intrathecal saline (sham surgery) to deter-
mine the need for an implantable device—the only way,
in our opinion, to morally justify this practice (with the
danger of becoming paternalistic) is to fulfill the follow-
ing conditions: (i) the placebo effect is examined in a
research context, and (ii) all other attempts to find a
nondeceptive alternative to placebo have failed. If these
conditions are not fulfilled, the use of placebo in pain
practice should be discouraged.
References
1. Brody H (1995) Placebo. In: Reich WT (ed) Encyclopedia of
bioethics. Macmillan, New York, pp. 1951–1953
2. World Medical Association. (2000) Declaration of Helsinki. Ethi-
cal principles for medical research involving human subjects.
http://www.wma.net/e/ethicsunit/helsinki.htm
3. Freedman B, Glass KC, Weijer C (1996) Placebo orthodoxy in
clinical research. J Law Med Ethics, 24:243–259
4. Rothman KJ, Michels KB (1994) The continuing unethical use of
placebo controls. N Engl J Med, 331:394–398
5. Tugwell P, Bombardier C, Gent M, et al. (1990) Low dose
cyclosporine versus placebo in patients with rheumatoid arthritis.
Lancet 335:1051–1055
6. Kiev A (1992) A double blind, placebo controlled study of
paroxetine in depressed out-patients. J Clin Psychiatry 53(Suppl):
27–29
7. Beck TM, Ciociola AA, Jones SE, Harvey WH, Tchekmedyian
NS, Chang A, Galvin D, Hart NE (1993) Efficacy of oral
ondansetron in the prevention of emesis in outpatients receiving
cyclophsphamide based chemotherapy. Ann Int Med 118:407–413
8. Carr AA, Bottini PB, Prisnat LM, Fisher LD, Devane JG,
O’Brien DE, Rhoades RB (1991) Once daily verapamil in the
treatment of mild to moderate hypertension. A double blind pla-
cebo controlled dose ranging study. J Clin Pharmacol 31:144–150
9. Michels KB, Rothman KJ (2003) Update on unethical use of
placebos in randomized trials. Bioethics 17:188–204
10. Keating B (2004) L’éthique de la recherche et l’usage du placebo.
Un état de la question au Canada. Med Sci 20:118–125
2 One may imagine a “hierarchy of placebo effects” as: active
treatment > sham surgery > placebo drug (suggested as an
active drug) > inert substance (no suggestion made) > no
treatment
A. Cahana and S. Romagnioli: Placebo and pain 105
11. Carlson RV, Boyd KM, Webb DJ (2004) The revision of the
Declaration of Helsinki: past, present and future. Br J Clin
Pharmacol 57:695–713
12. Amanzino M, Benedetti F (1999) Neuropharmacological dissec-
tion of placebo analgesia: expectation-activated opioid systems
versus conditioning-activated specific subsystems. J Neurosci
19:484–494
13. Mayberg HS, Silva JA, Brannan SK, Tekell JL, Mahurin RK,
McGinnis S, Jerabek PA (2002) The functional neuroanatomy of
the placebo effect. Am J Psychiatry 159:728–737
14. Petroviç P, Kalso E, Petersson KM, Ingvar M (2002) Placebo and
opioid analgesia imaging: a shared neuronal network. Science
295:1737–1740
15. Yanagawa T, Tango T, Hiejima Y (1994) Mantel-Haenzel type
tests for testing equivalence or more than equivalence in com-
parative clinical trials. Biometrics 50:859–864
16. Horng S, Miller FG (2002) Is placebo surgery unethical? N Engl J
Med 347:137–139
17. Cobb LA, Thomas GI, Dillard DH, Merendino KA, Bruce RA
(1959) An evaluation of internal mammary artery ligation by a
double blind technique. N Engl J Med 260:1115–1118
18. Dimond EG, Kittle CF, Crocket JE (1960) Comparison of inter-
nal mammary artery ligation and sham operation for angina pec-
toris. Am J Cardiol 5:483–486
19. Moseley JB, O’Malley K, Petersen NJ, Menke TJ, Brody BA,
Kuykendall DH, Hollingsworth JC, Ashton CM, Wray NP (2002)
A controlled trial of arthroscopic surgery for osteoarthritis of the
knee. N Engl J Med 347:81–88
20. Temple RJ (1997) When are clinical trials of a given agent versus
placebo no longer appropriate or feasible? Control Clin Trials
18:613–620
21. Konstam MA, Pina I, Lindenfeld J, Packer M (2003) A device is
not a drug. J Cardiac Failure 9:155–157
22. Macklin R (1999) The ethical problems with sham surgery in
clinical research. N Engl J Med 341:992–996
23. Horng S, Miller FG (2003) Ethical framework for the use of sham
procedures in clinical trials. Crit Care Med 31:S126–S130
24. Ricœur P (2001) Les trois niveaux du jugement médical. Esprit,
pp. 21–33
25. Rich BA (2003) A placebo for pain: a medico-legal case analysis.
Pain Medicine 4:366–372
26. Hill J (2003) Placebo in clinical care: for whose pleasure? Lancet
362:254
27. Benaroyo L (2004) Soin, confiance et disponibilité. Ethique et
Santé 1:60–63
